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Article 8

BOOK REVIEWS
The Year of our Lord 1943: Christian Humanism in an Age of Crisis. Alan Jacobs. Oxford University
Press, 2018. 280pp. ISBN:978-0190864651. Reviewed by Dr. Walker Cosgrove, Associate Professor
of History, Dordt University.
I wrestle often with matters of faith and the ways
it ought to shape me as a human, though rarely do
I arrive at satisfactory answers. When I first saw the
publication of the newest book by Alan Jacobs—
Distinguished Professor of Humanities in the Honors
Program and Distinguished Senior Fellow at the
Institute for Studies of Religion at Baylor University,
as well as author of many notable, diverse books on
religion and literature—I thought it could possibly
assist me. I was immediately drawn to it because in
my early 20s I ransacked many used bookstores for
works by the key literary figures discussed in Jacobs’
book, in particular T.S. Eliot, C.S. Lewis, and W.H.
Auden; as well, I have turned to Jacques Maritain and
Simone Weil in subsequent years, who are also Jacobs’
main subjects.
Upon reading this book, I realized that I was not
wrong to think it would help. However, I did not
foresee Jacobs’ tone of pessimism at the end, which
left me with more questions than answers.
At its core, this book is about five “humanistic”
intellectuals active in 1943 and beyond—Eliot, Lewis,
Auden, Maritain, and Weil—who attempted to cast
a vision for Western society after the Second World
War, a vision in which Christianity played a central
role in the rebuilding process (xv). As Jacobs writes,
“The war raised for each of the thinkers I have named
a pressing set of questions about the relationship
between Christianity and the Western democratic
social order, especially about whether Christianity was
uniquely suited to the moral underpinning of that
order” because each thought that the entrenchment of
positivism and relativism in society led to a politics of
power, which made the West as morally suspect and as
dangerous as Hitler (xvi, 9, 13).
A major challenge Jacobs faced with this book is
that these intellectuals do not form a cohesive group
and did not directly interact much; all that holds
them together is that as Christians, each struggled
against the West’s descent into technocracy. That said,
Jacobs is successful in providing a unifying theme
to his otherwise diverse cast of characters, namely,
that they were Christian humanists who feared the
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unbridled power and force leading to technocratic
empires and the kind of post-human society we are
experiencing today. To combat these dark trends, they
encouraged society to re-engage its Christian heritage,
particularly through a specific vision of educating the
next generation in the line of Augustine’s notion of
ordo amoris (137).
In chapter 2—which along with chapter 1 provides
the intellectual background for the rest of the book—
Jacobs explores the first half of the book’s subtitle,
“Christian Humanism,” emphasizing the literary bent
of his subjects. Here, which is in some sense a defense
of his whole project, Jacobs connects his subjects with
humanists of the early Italian Renaissance, since both
thought that literature possesses a certain power to
transform individuals and societies in more humane
ways. He argues that while these thinkers focused on
literature and not philosophy or theology, they were
no less theological or Christian for doing so (39). He
is quick to add that none of these thinkers, other than
Maritain, thought of themselves as humanists. But,
with the early Italian humanists of the 14th through
16th centuries, they desired a kind of restoration of
society through a vision cast by literature and the arts
(50).
The “crisis” in the second half of the subtitle of
Jacobs’ book, “An Age of Crisis,” is about what vision
would be cast for the future of the post-war West.
While Lewis abhorred Nazism, he thought that
what was equally dangerous was a kind of unbridled
nationalism that emphasized self-interest and the
politics of power over anything else, and which also
attached the church and Christianity to any national
cause (9, 11). Lewis feared that absent higher ends,
especially if the state co-opted the church, leaders will
base their ideas of justice and peace on the interest
of a powerful nation-state. Instead of seeking the
flourishing of humanity, the state then pursues the
entrenchment of the powerful and wealthy, and it uses
people to achieve this end (16). He suggests that this is
seen mostly clearly when society replaces First Things
with Second Things, arguing in The Weight of Glory
that part of the problem is that society absolutized

politics and moved people to the periphery (56, 61).
In his reflections on power, Auden compares
mid-20th century Europe with the Roman empire
from Augustus to Constantine (79-80). For Auden,
according to Jacobs, great care had to be put into
any sort of Christian renewal of society because the
danger of the state co-opting the church was strong.
Auden points to Christianity under Constantine,
which became a means to an end, namely the thing
that would save the Roman Empire (81). Reflecting
on Auden’s ideas, Jacobs writes,
And what is Caesar? What President Eisenhower, in his farewell address to the nation in
1961, called the “military-industrial complex”;
what Michel Foucault called the “powerknowledge regime”; what Auden himself in
“New Year Letter” had called “the machine.”
In a word, Caesar is Force (82).
For Auden, the only possible end of Force and
power is the birth of Jesus Christ, as he writes, “This
Child marks the end of the machine, the end of the
military-industrial complex, the end of force” (85,
italics original).
Similar to Auden, Weil saw “Force” as the dark
underbelly of Western history since the Greco-Roman
era. She was unsure if the West had developed a
counternarrative to the Iliad, that great epic about
force, and as Jacobs writes, “In the three remaining
years of her life, Weil would devote much of her
intellectual energy to the attempt to ask what might
prompt and ground an authentic and adequate answer
to Homer’s ‘poem of force,’ and epic of another power,
another ethos” (94). She also worried about the lure of
power and force for the church in its attempt to bring
the gospel to the world, and locates this problem not
with Constantine but rather the Gothic era of the high
medieval world (96-97). That said, when the church
eschews power, it fulfills its fullest potential, as Weil
writes, “…the conviction was suddenly borne in upon
me that Christianity is preeminently the religion of
slaves, that slaves cannot help belonging to it, and I
among others” (57). The only way to combat Force,
according to her, is through humility and spiritual
poverty, and the church is most successful in its
humility and weakness (157-158).
Jacobs’ book builds to a crescendo in the answer
these intellectuals provided for the problem of the
post-war West. The West got to the brink of destroying
itself because of poor education, and thus the midtwentieth-century Christian humanists attempted to
cast their visions for true education as the solution for

the rebuilding efforts (xiv, xv, 36). It was essential that
Christian virtue and truth had to infuse these efforts
because, as Lewis writes, “war creates no absolutely
new situation; it simply aggravates the permanent
human situation so that we can no longer ignore it.
Human life has always been lived on the edge of a
precipice” (103). The end of the war was not the end
of the problem but was instead the moment to begin
addressing it more intentionally.
For these intellectuals, education—and thus
cultural formation and rebirth—ought to be properly
centered around formation, or becoming more fully
human, rather than simply the accumulation of
pragmatic information. As Auden writes, lack of good
teaching means that students do “not wish to become
wise, only to be wise, to graduate cum laude” (145),
which Jacobs follows with, “[Auden] thereby drives a
wedge between the quest for genuine wisdom and the
desire to be academically (and then, of course, socially
and economically) successful” (145-146).
As well, Jacobs writes this about Maritain:
The best summary I can make of Maritain’s
subtle argument goes like this: “Though intuition and love cannot be taught directly, it
is the task of the teacher to help form young
people so that when the opportunity comes,
outside of school, for them to acquire intuition and love, they will be prepared to do so.
Teachers, then, play a pivotal role in the building and sustaining of meaningful human culture: if they do not intervene in young people’s
lives, in the indirect yet distinctive way that
only they can, the culture will surely, if slowly,
fall.” (127)
It is easy to criticize despotic totalitarianism of
the 20th century for destroying true human culture;
however, Maritain was equally concerned about
dangers of pragmatism in the west and its influence
on the future of education and culture in western
democracies. It seems clear that in the nearly 80 years
since the end of the Second World War, Maritain
prophetically predicted the technocratic pragmatism
that undergirds much of the American economy. He
thought post-war society was not educating in a truly
human way but merely training each person to become
a tool of a technocratic society, leading, ultimately, to
the death of genuine humane culture (129-130).
Whether intentional or not, Jacobs’ book ends
on a note of pessimism. The final chapter examines
these intellectuals post-1943, when they realize that
the post-war will go in a different direction than the
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one for which all in their own ways advocated, and
thus all move into different projects disconnected
to their war-year efforts. The sense one gets is that
they all give up, with the exception of Weil, who
had already died by this point (170ff, 190ff). In the
afterward Jacobs concentrates on Jacques Ellul, and
the ways in which Ellul moves in a different direction
from these intellectuals as he thinks about Christian
life in a post-Christian world. It is hard to know if
Jacobs is optimistic or pessimistic about the place of
the Christian intellectual in helping to shape the world
today. While he lauds his subjects, ultimately he has to
admit that “they came perhaps a century too late, after
the reign of technocracy had become so complete that
none can foresee the end of it while this world lasts”
(206). And he seems to know, or at least hope, that
another generation of thinkers will rise and attempt

to shape the patterns of culture. But he also seems to
question whether or not they will arise on time, or
show up too late like these thinkers (206).
Jacobs’ book is well worth a read by anyone
interested in wrestling with the Christian’s role in
post-Christian society, those interested in any of
these literary figures particularly, or even those who
simply enjoy Jacobs’ prose. One of the most enjoyable
aspects of this book for me is Jacobs’ readings on a
variety of texts by these intellectuals. At times, it was
almost as if I had the opportunity to eavesdrop in a
Jacobs’ seminar on these writers, and as a result I look
forward to carving out time to reread many of these
texts. Alan Jacobs has my thanks for writing this book
that has shaped my subsequent thinking, teaching,
and writing.

Understanding Ignorance: The Surprising Impact of What We Don’t Know. Daniel R. DeNicola. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2017. 250 pp. ISBN 978-0-262-03644-3. Reviewed by Dr. Carl P.
Fictorie, Professor of Chemistry, Dordt University.
In Understanding Ignorance, Daniel DeNicola
invites us into a paradox, an attempt to understand
what we don’t know. Early in the book, he
acknowledges this paradox and confronts possible
objections to his efforts to understand ignorance:
“[p]rofessing to write a whole book on ignorance,” he
says, “reeks of clever irony and invites sarcasm” (10).
Yet the paradox of the title drew me into reading this
book. I learned that there is a wealth of knowledge
about ignorance, and understanding facets of our
ignorance aids in our understanding our knowledge.
In this comprehensive but not exhaustive overview,
DeNicola shows that understanding something
about ignorance is very helpful to knowledge and
wisdom.
DeNicola is Professor of Philosophy at Gettysburg
College, and while the book is philosophical in tone,
it is not overly technical, so it meets his goal of being
approachable by a wide range of readers (xii). At the
same time, the book serves as groundwork for the
development of a new field of epistemology that
integrates knowledge and ignorance into a single
discipline (13, 208). Time will tell whether that goal
was achieved and whether this field takes hold in
academic circles.
In the opening chapter, DeNicola provides his
impetus for studying ignorance. He surveys modern
Western culture and observes a “tenacious strain of
anti-intellectualism in American life” (7). Published
in 2017, Understanding Ignorance was presumably
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written just before or at the start of Donald Trump’s
term as president, and the author clearly sees and
laments the era of “fake news” in this larger antiintellectual context. It is precisely because of this
anti-intellectualism that a book such as this is
needed. DeNicola reminds us that Western culture
from the time of Socrates has placed great value on
knowledge while viewing ignorance as a vice (9). As
we progress through the book, the author argues
that not all knowledge is good and not all ignorance
is bad. In fact, understanding ignorance is, for the
author, necessary if we are to gain knowledge.
A nuanced discussion of two conceptual
challenges is the subject of the second chapter. First,
DeNicola describes ignorance as a negative concept,
one which indicates the absence of something, in this
case the lack of knowledge (16). This concept can
become problematic when we try to treat this lack as
a real entity in and of itself. The author suggests that
“ignorance implies the capacity to learn,” making
ignorance a key part of the structure of knowledge
(18).
The second conceptual challenge is the paradox
that to try to understand ignorance must necessarily
destroy that ignorance with knowledge, the problem
implied in the title of the book. However, DeNicola
argues that this is conflating the concept of ignorance
with the content or subject of that ignorance. It is
possible to know that one does not know something
without specifying what that something is (19).

